A Reconceptualization of Rationality in Security Studies: Beyond Expected Utility and Toward Enriched Strategic Decision-Making

Abstract

Objective: This article critiques the dominant use of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in security studies and proposes an enriched conceptualization of rationality better suited for analyzing real-world strategic decision-making under uncertainty. While EUT provides an elegant model of rational choice, its core assumptions—that actors can assign precise probabilities to outcomes and possess stable utility functions—often fail to capture the complexities of statecraft. This study aims to bridge the gap between theoretical models and observed strategic behavior by integrating insights from behavioral economics, cognitive psychology, and organizational theory.

Methods: The study employs a conceptual and qualitative approach, synthesizing existing theoretical frameworks with empirical evidence. The Vietnam War serves as a critical case study to demonstrate the limitations of EUT and the explanatory power of an enriched model. Analysis focuses on how decision-making during this period was shaped by subjective probability assessments, cognitive biases, and organizational pressures, rather than a rigid cost-benefit calculus. We draw on historical accounts, memoirs, and declassified intelligence reports to illustrate how the definition of success shifted, and decisions were influenced by factors like the sunk-cost fallacy and overconfidence.

Results: The Vietnam case study reveals three primary limitations of EUT: (1) the inability of policymakers to assign precise, objective probabilities to complex geopolitical events, (2) the dynamic and shifting nature of utility functions in response to political pressures, and (3) the significant influence of cognitive biases and organizational constraints on strategic choices. The article demonstrates that a model incorporating bounded rationality, subjective probability, and heuristics provides a more accurate and comprehensive account of decision-making during the conflict.

Conclusion: We argue for a reconceptualization of rationality that moves beyond EUT's strict assumptions. The proposed enriched framework offers a more realistic lens for understanding state behavior, not as a deviation from rationality, but as a different, more nuanced form of it. The article concludes by outlining policy implications, including the need for improved probabilistic reasoning, the use of structured analytic techniques, and the promotion of collaborative analysis to mitigate bias and enhance decision-making in security contexts.