CHECKS AND BALANCES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN UZBEKISTAN

Abstract

This article examines the system of checks and balances as a core principle of public administration and constitutional governance, emphasizing its role in preventing the concentration of power, ensuring accountability, and safeguarding democratic values. Drawing on political theory, comparative constitutional practice, and contemporary administrative challenges, the study analyzes how checks and balances function within classical tripartite government and modern bureaucratic systems. Special attention is given to the transformation of these mechanisms under conditions of technological change, crisis governance, and populist politics. Empirical illustrations are provided through the case of Uzbekistan, where recent administrative and legal reforms demonstrate the practical relevance of institutional oversight, transparency, and judicial review. The article integrates theoretical models of policy error, accountability, and corruption control with real statistical indicators, offering a holistic view of checks and balances as both a normative ideal and an operational tool of governance.